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Communism as History
After the fall of Soviet communism, the loudest voice reaching a wider audience was one 
of moral condemnation. The most prominent example of this was the French historian 
Stéphane Courtois’ Black Book of Communism.1 In Germany, too, the end of communism 
witnessed a mood of understandable moral condemnation. And, more widely, the revival 
of totalitarian theory in the 1990s gained official sanction with the publication of the 
multivolume Enquette Commission report into the “second German dictatorship.”2 
There were undoubtedly crimes, terror and repression throughout the lifespan of the 
Soviet Union, China and the post-1945 regimes in Eastern Europe, and totalitarian 
theory — and its derivatives — is not without scholarly merit; although the model was 
often used as a vehicle for Western anti-communism as much as an analytical framework 
per se. Yet, at least in the opinion of this reviewer, the agenda to historicise communism 
will lead to a fuller understanding of the origins and development of communism in 
the “Age of Extremes” (Hobsbawm). There is also a need to understand communism’s 
seductive attractions and early idealism as well as its Stalinist transformation, post-Stalinist 
stagnation and decline and also to account for China’s path from Mao to contemporary 
global economic giant. At the forefront of the agenda to historicise communism was the 
late, great Hermann Weber and the Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung he 
founded in 1993 to publish research on global communism.3
Communism in Power
The aim of understanding communism by seeing it in the round, identifying “the diversity 
that existed alongside the uniformity,” is the explicit call of Stephen A. Smith, the editor of 
the Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism. Smith calls for research that, “should 
seek to avoid moralizing condemnation, one the one hand, and credulous apologetics, on 
1 Stéphane Courtois et al.: The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, and Repression, 
Cambridge 1999; see also Francois Furet: The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism 
in the Twentieth Century, London 1999. 
2 For a wider discussion of totalitarian theory and the German Democratic Republic, see 
Corey Ross: The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation 
of the GDR, London 2002, pp. 20 – 25; see also Mike Dennis / Norman LaPorte: State and 
Minorities in Communist East Germany, Oxford 2011, pp. 12 ff.
3 See also Hermann Weber: Zehn Jahre Historische Kommunismusforschung: Leistung, Defizit, 
Perspektiven, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 50:4 (2002), pp. 611 – 633.
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the other.”4 By and large, this is the spirit that runs through this mighty tome in which 
36 chapters (including the introduction) are divided into six subsections and spill of over 
650 informative and readable pages. The tone is set by Smith’s introduction, which begins 
by reminding us that October 1917 inspired the belief that humankind could make a 
new and better world, free of classes and capitalist exploitation.5 This idealism expanded 
well beyond the ranks the Bolsheviks and informed (admittedly minority) perceptions 
globally — even in post-1918 Britain.6 But the lived-reality of communism is never far 
away. As Smith details, communism’s authoritarianism saw the crushing of dissert and, in 
Soviet Russia, the ending of the radical experiment in workers’ democracy “from below” 
in 1917 / 18 was replaced by the enduring Soviet model of one-party dictatorship which 
took shape by 1921.7 In reality, what was on offer was not the radical democracy and 
egalitarianism foreign admirers identified with well into the second half of the century; 
but it did serve as a more prosaic model for rapid economic and social transformation in 
the developing world. Here there was an upside: after 1945 Soviet Russia and, from 1949, 
communist China, offered their support to Marxist inflected nationalisms which sought 
to end colonialism and, more widely, racism. A discussion of this topic peppers many of 
chapters. It is also a theme which runs throughout most of the books under review: the 
seeming alternative to global capitalism and the geopolitical West offered by communism.
Smith’s introduction is also able to provide the reader with what amounts to a ty po-
lo gy of conditions producing communist states. “If one is looking for a single cause of 
communist revolution,” he observes, “it is war.” Almost no state was able to build on 
traditions of democracy, civil liberties or the rule of law (the exception was Czechoslovakia); 
almost every communist state inherited a “backward” agrarian-dominated economy (the 
exceptions were Czechoslovakia and East Germany); and when “successful” revolutions 
survived to become states — from Russia and China to Vietnam and Cuba — there 
inheritance was economic “backwardness,” political tyranny and social inequality; in other 
cases, colonial rule had inflamed national liberation movements.8 Yet, if violence before, 
during and after these revolutions was a common theme, then the collapse of Soviet-
styled communism was surprisingly peaceful in Eastern Europe, especially given the 
4 Stephen Smith: The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism, Oxford 2014, 
pp. 32 – 33.
5 On this point, see also Michael Buckmiller: Bilanz eines russisch-deutschen Forschungsprojekt, 
in: Michael Buckmiller / Klaus Meschkat (eds.): Biographisches Handbuch zur Geschichte der 
Kommunistischen Internationale: Ein deutsch-russisches Forschungsprojekt, Berlin 2007, 
pp. 19 – 20.
6 See, for example, Ian Bullock: Romancing the Revolution: The Myth of Soviet Democracy 
and the British Left, Alberta 2011.
7 Stephen Smith, Oxford Handbook, pp. 7 – 8; see also his impressive: The Russian Revolution: 
A Very Short Introduction, Oxford 2002.
8 Stephen Smith, Oxford Handbook, pp. 17, 23.
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militarised Cold War tensions underpinning American anti-communism until the arrival 
of Gorbachev in the mid-1980s.9 Smith also draws on his dual specialisms of Soviet and 
Chinese communist history to engage with the destructive power of Gorbachev’s parallel 
political and economic reforms, observing that the policy choice in China of opting for 
economic reform driven by the party dictatorship may well be the key to understanding 
communism’s — or, more accurately, the party’s — survival and significance today.10
Although organised in subsections (or “Parts”, as the editor terms them) the essays in the 
Handbook overlap in their themes and topics as they inform the reader about communism 
as a (dis)functional system of governance which grew out of the idealistic aims informing 
a diversity of social movements. The collection begins with a section entitled “Ideology,” 
which covers the midwives of communism, Marx and Engels (Paresh Chattopadhyay), 
Leninism (Lars T. Lih), Stalinism (Kevin McDermott) and Maoism (Timothy Cheek). 
To quote one authority on both Marxism and communism, “Some political movements 
(such as liberalism) exist in reality before they exist in the mind. Communism on the 
other hand existed in the mind long before there was a real communist movement.”11 
And this appears to be the reason to include Paresh Chattopadhyay’s chapter. While 
there is renewed interest in Marx in the twenty-first century as a critique of capitalism,12 
the author’s Marx, however, remains one we met last century: the humanist who realised 
that “society cannot be liberated without the liberation of each individual” through the 
transformation of the mode of production and an end to the alienation of labour.13 It is 
hard to find this ever being translated into state policy.
The following section (“Moments”) takes us on a whistle-stop tour of seminal moments 
in communism’s global trajectory and, most impressively, all of these chapters present 
their given years from a truly global perspective. Taken together, the reader gets a sense 
of historical boom and bust: the high hopes of “1919” in the colonial East as well as 
“advanced” capitalist western Europe (Jean-François Fayet); we then descend through 
“1936”, which saw the “Great Terror” in Soviet Russia at the same time as the Comintern’s 
“Popular Front” against fascism and (limited) defence of the Spanish Republic (Tim 
Rees). “1956” and the failed experiment with de-Stalinisation looks not only as the 
interrelationship between events in Poland and, above all, Hungary; it also highlights 
the significant role of China as an arbiter at the top-table of world communism and how 
these events accelerated the Sino-Soviet split (Serge Radchenko). And “1968” witnessed 
an anti-authoritarian, sexually-awakened revolt in the West as tanks rolled in to crush 
Czech “communism with a human face” in the East; yet Cuba’s Fidel Castro personified 
9 See Matthias Middell: 1989, in: Stephen Smith, Oxford Handbook, ch. 9. 
10 Stephen Smith, Oxford Handbook, p. 17.
11 Ben Fowkes: Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic, London 1984, p. 1.
12 See, for example, Alain Badiou: The Communist Hypothesis, in: New Left Review 49:1 
(2008), pp. 29 – 42.
13 Stephen Smith, Oxford Handbook, pp. 46 – 47. 
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the continuing appeal of communism in the Third World. Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” 
and the mobilisation of youth against “capitalist roaders” is also detailed as a reaction 
to Soviet “bureaucratism” (all of this is covered in the chapter by Maud Anne Bracke). 
Finally, we arrive at the “bust” of “1989”, which is presented as a consequence of longer 
term structural economic factors, generational change and the seminal role of Gorbachev 
and his mission to end the Cold War (Matthias Middell). 
Importantly, Middell’s appraisal of the “end of communism” also notes that some states 
survived the historical caesura of 1989. Above all this meant China, which is the topic of a 
valuable survey chapter by Yang Kuisong and Stephen Smith, which covers over a century 
of the country’s history in the section addressing “Global Communism.” Firstly, there is 
a largely political sketch of the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under 
the aegis the Comintern in 1921, the troubled relationship this provoked, and then the 
party’s expansion — in membership and especially geographically — as a result of a renewed 
alliance with the nationalist Guomindang in the war against Japan. In the ensuing civil 
war — which had already drawn China into the nascent Cold War — achieving victory by 
encircling cities from the countryside was “exported” to the Third World as a revolutionary 
model. Then, with the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 
1949, we see Maoism in practice. The regime’s aim was to achieve socialism as rapidly as 
possible. However, this policy produced a famine (1958 – 60) killing millions; unleashed 
a “class struggle” in the name of egalitarianism in which social purges led to some 1.6 
million executions between 1950 and 1962, and millions more were arrested and sent for 
“re-education” through labour. Importantly, the “Cultural Revolution” wracked society 
until Mao’s death in 1976. It is at this point the focus of the chapter switches to the rise of 
China as an economic superpower, which abandoned socialism but kept the authoritarian 
one-party state. The story is one of qualified success. China rose from the ashes of Maoism 
to become a major economy, with heightened geopolitical and military influence. At 
home, Peking offered sufficient affluence to the rising urban, educated middle classes 
to stave off anything other than localised protest. All this makes a fascinating survey, 
and China is also covered in many of the other chapters in a manner accessible to the 
non-expert, making this perhaps the Handbook’s most valuable contribution.
The section devoted to “Communist Polities and Economics” shows the interaction 
between politics and economics, which come together in their most extreme form in 
the horrors of political terror and manmade famine. Yet, as Geoffrey Robert’s chapter 
illustrates, the Soviet Union was able to project itself as a force for peace during the Cold 
War. And Paul Betts introduces us to “Consumerism in Communist Societies.” The 
treatment of “Social Relations” also extends from the “Life of a Militant” (Marco Alberto) 
to the reestablishment of social hierarchies (Donald Filtzer). As the Czech exile Milan 
Kundera told us during the Cold War, communism had no sense of humour — and also 
tried to rewrite citizens’ memory of communist rule. But this, Donald Filtzer reminds us, 
did not prevent Soviet citizens cracking jokes — and remembering. One political joke, for 
example, has Brezhnev’s mother warning her son to beware that, if the “Reds” return, he is 
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in serious trouble. Finally, we are presented with the world of “Communism in Culture,” 
which ranges from religious persecution (Richard Madsen) to sport (Robert Edelman et 
al.). The inevitable downside is the varying quality of contributions and, at times, précis 
appeared to take precedence over precision; but this is something which will only irk 
specialists — and there are few who could cover the span of this volume. 
Towards a General Theory of Communism?
At various points, Stephen Smith reminds the reader of his reluctance to reduce 
communism to a single essence, as presented in the Black Book of Communism. He also 
states that he would rather “leave to one side” social scientists’ interest in classifying 
communist regimes, from “totalitarian” to “state socialism.” But he does aim to provide 
a “historical and analytical framework” providing coherence to the diversity of essays 
in this volume.14 In doing so, he opts for the definition “generic communism,” which 
amounts to a list of features which are “common elements” in “communist regimes 
across the globe.” In truncated form, these amount to: (1) a violent seizure of power, 
which dispenses with democracy and uses a leadership figure to aid the regime’s (limited) 
legitimacy; (2) a strictly centralised one-party state, which is highly bureaucratic and 
hierarchical; (3) the proscription of all organisations outside of party control; (4) the 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which includes the utopian ambition to create the “New 
Person” as well as the justification for political repression; (5) censorship of intellectual 
and artistic life; (6) an intrusive secret political police limiting citizens “autonomous 
space”; (7) a state owned and directed economy, which to varying degrees accommodates 
a “shadow economy.”15 Although Smith’s “generic communism” is dynamic — accounting 
for change over time and specific local influences — he concludes that we should not 
speak of “communisms” in the plural. Instead, variations between regimes “are perhaps 
best construed as mutations of a single genus — its species, as it were — that spread across 
far-flung geographical spaces and temporal zones.”16 Despite the author’s caveats, one is 
left feeling that this is so close to a variant of “totalitarianism” that some wider engagement 
with the specific literature would have been valuable.17 It is, after all, at the centre of 
how historians across the spectrum of the historiographical debates have located their 
14 Ibid., pp. 4 – 5.
15 Ibid., esp. pp. 3 – 4, 25, 29 – 30.
16 Ibid, p. 4.
17 For the “classic” model of totalitarianism, which produced a six-point checklist of features, 
see Carl J. Friedrich / Zbigniew Brzezinski: Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge 1965. For an overview of aspects of “totalitarianism” in communist studies, see 
also Norman LaPorte: Introduction: Isaac Deutscher and Biographer’s Dilemma, in: Moving 
the Social 51 (2014), pp. 5 – 30.
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research — not least in more recent research on Germany and Soviet Russia.18 Equally, as 
the term “generic communism” is redolent of the term “generic fascism” it would have 
been useful to know whether — or not — the definition had any roots in the vexed debates 
about how to approach the regimes, movements and ideologies that have been housed 
under this conceptual roof.19 My own view (which is set out elsewhere) is that interaction 
with a diversity of “local” conditions merits the term communisms in the plural.20 Would 
anyone talk of generic capitalism, however much there are common features?
The Movement Phase of Communism 
in Weimar Germany 
Although not absent from Smith’s Handbook, its focus — as the author makes clear — is on 
communism in power. This section of the review essay aims to locate the under-researched 
movement phase of Germany communism within recurring debates about the dynamics 
of the German Communist Party (KPD): its changing relationship with the Weimar 
Republic and domestic society, its fixation on October 1917, and its connections with 
the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) and the Communist International 
(Comintern).21 
18 For an excellent discussion of the relative merits of totalitarianism and autonomous spaces in 
the German Democratic Republic, see Paul Betts: Within Walls: Private Life in the German 
Democratic Republic, Oxford 2010, pp.  21 – 50. For totalitarianism as a comparative 
framework, see, for example, Michael Geyer / Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.): Beyond Totalitarianism: 
Stalinism and Nazism Compared, Cambridge 2009.
19 For a discussion of “generic fascism,” see Roger Eatwell: The Nature of “Generic Fascism”: 
The “Fascist Minimum” and the “Fascist Matrix,” in: Constantin Iordachi (eds.): Comparative 
Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, London 2010, pp. 134 – 161.
20 Norman LaPorte: Local Communisms Within a Global Movement, in: Twentieth Century 
Communism: A Journal of International History 5 (2013), pp. 7 – 20; see also, Andreas 
Wirsching: Comparing Local Communisms’, in: Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal 
of International History 5 (2013), pp. 21 – 40. 
21 For a discussion of more recent literature on the Communist Party, see Norman LaPorte: Isaac 
Deutscher and Biographer’s Dilemma, in: Moving the Social 51 (2014), pp.14f; for reviews of 
more recent literature on the Communist Party, see Marcel Bois / Florian Wilde: Ein kleiner 
Boom: Entwicklung und Tendenzen der KPD-Forschung seit 1989 / 90, in: Jahrbuch für 
Historische Kommunismusforschung (2010), pp. 309 – 322.
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Biographical Approaches 
More recently, biography has gained prominence in the field of communist studies, 
including the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). And Ralf Hoffrogge has been at 
the forefront of this expanding historiography.22 His biography of Richard Müller is, 
however, far removed from the old fashioned “great-men-make-history” interpretation 
of high-political notoriety; instead, the political life of the protagonist is firmly located 
within the dynamics of a mass-based social movement “from below.” As the author points 
out, the failures of the man derives from the failures of the movement. But we also learn 
a great deal about Richard Müller as a “forgotten revolutionary” and the Revolutionary 
Shop Stewards (RSS) as a “forgotten movement,”23 as well as why he was forgotten. In 
this respect, Ralf Hoffrogge argues that during the Cold War historians adopted clear-cut 
politicised narratives: Marxism-Leninism in the East and variants of Social Democracy’s 
“democracy or dictatorship” in the West. This left no place for Richard Müller and his 
council-communist predilections. Broadly speaking this is true, despite his role as a 
significant, if transient, political leader.24 
In 1896, at 16 years of age, Richard Müller left his family home in the Thuringia village 
of Weira as an orphan in order to take up an apprenticeship as a lathe operator in Berlin’s 
giant factories. Joining the German Metal Workers’ Union in 1906, by 1914 he had risen 
to become the head of the capital’s metal-working turners’ branch. Not untypically, it 
was Social Democracy’s support for the war effort — the Burgfrieden — which transformed 
a mainstream union official into a revolutionary. Politically, Richard Müller joined the 
anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) in 1917. But, more 
importantly, he led the vast oppositional movement within the trade unions, which 
expressed itself in the burgeoning mass-strike movement, first in Berlin then nationally. 
This, Hoffrogge informs us, is an important reminder that the November Revolution 
found its immediate origins on the shop floor as well as in the trenches.25 
It was in the early days of the German Revolution that Richard Müller reached the 
zenith of his prominence. As chair of the Berlin Executive Committee of the Workers’ 
Councils he was in effect head of state. But man and movement began to diverge. In 
22 Ralf Hoffrogge: Werner Scholem: Eine politische Biographie (1895 – 1940), Constance /
Munich 2014.
23 Ralf Hoffrogge: Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movement, Berlin 2014, p. 5. 
24 For a discussion of this, see: Ralf Hoffrogge, Richard Müller, pp. 197 ff. For an example how 
important political studies omitted any detail about Richard Müller, see the scant reference 
to him in David Morgan: The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the 
German Independent Social Democratic Party: 1917 – 1922, New York 1975. 
25 Ralf Hoffrogge, Richard Müller, p. 8.
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December 1918, the first national congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils voted to 
convene a National Assembly, which opted for constitutional parliamentary democracy 
as opposed to the council system favoured by Müller. As he had previously told the Berlin 
Workers’ Council that the National Assembly would meet over his dead body, the Social 
Democratic press lasting dubbed him “Corpse Müller.”26 
Together with fellow Shop Steward and USPD leader Ernst Däumig, Richard Müller 
now took up the banner of a “pure council system” against the backdrop of a series of 
defeats in 1919 / 20 for the ideas, organisations and movement supporting this position. 
The first of these defeats was imposed by Gustav Noske, the new Defence Minister and 
self-styled “bloody hound of the revolution.” The use of Free Corps to suppressed the 
strike movement for “socialisation” in spring 1919 — and the overthrow of localised 
“council experiments” — lastingly deepened divisions on the left, which had their origins 
in opposition to the excessive moderation and caution of the so-called Majority Social 
Democratic Party’s (SPD) National Assembly.27 As Hans Mommsen lamented, the party’s 
obsession with restoring order flowed into the Free Corps’ fanatical anti-Bolshevism, 
which stabilised the new political order with violence and failed to uproot the institutions 
of the old German Empire.28 In the short term, it forced the “revolution from below” 
to reroute into the more limited channels offered by the factory councils, which were 
given state sanction in 1920. Unlike Däumig, who was a national leader of the USPD, 
Richard Müller’s political arena was above all the metal workers’ union (DMV). Here, too, 
Richard Müller suffered a defeat. This time from his archrival, Robert Dissmann, who 
in the autumn of 1920 ensured that, even in the metal workers’ union, which had been 
the only major union to support “anchoring” the workers’ councils in the Constitution, 
maintained traditional forms of organisation.29 Finally, Richard Müller — together with 
the left-wing of the USPD — joined the Communist Party at its “second foundation” at 
the end of 1920. However, like the other Revolutionary Shop Stewards activists who 
turned to Bolshevism, Richard Müller soon discovered that the Leninist vanguard party 
had no leadership role for someone with his commitment to grass-roots revolution from 
below. In April 1921, after the so-called “March Rising,” he was ousted as head of the 
Communist Trade Union Centre in a factional feud which made clear that the party was 
the vehicle of “revolution from above” and the Comintern was the arbiter of what policies 
served this aim in Germany.
26 Ibid., p. 232.
27 For a discussion of the “council idea” and “works council” in the period with extensive 
documentation, see Ben Fowkes: The German Left and the Weimar Republic: A Selection of 
Documents, Leiden / Boston 2014, pp. 43 – 70.
28 Hans Mommsen: The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1989, 
p. 50.
29 Ralf Hoffrogge, Richard Müller, pp. 151 – 152.
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Richard Müller’s life as a political leader was short, spanning the years from 1916 until 
1921. Thereafter, Hoffrogge notes that, “Having emerged out of obscurity, he [Müller] 
disappeared into darkness.”30 One of the few leaders of working class-origins during 
these events now left the main stage of Weimar politics. In the mid-1920s, he published 
a three volume account of the German Revolution and, in a brief trade unionist reprise 
at the end of the decade, was involved in the German Industrial League which was also 
associated with the dissident Communist Karl Korsch. What was not known until now 
was that Richard Müller became an entrepreneur. He set up a building company and 
became a private landlord, who received criticism in the communist press. He did not 
actively undertake opposition to the Third Reich and died peacefully in Berlin in 1943.
There are, however, two areas in which Hoffrogge’s otherwise compelling account 
of Richard Müller as a champion of “revolution from below” could have been further 
qualified. Firstly, although the German Revolution was a spontaneous German “revolution 
from below” carried by the Councils, the influence of the Russian Revolution in the mind 
of Richard Müller — and other revolutionaries — was also a factor, as it was throughout 
much of post-war Europe.31 For example, Müller and the RSS had planned an uprising 
modelled on October 1917, which was overtaken by events in early November 1918.32 
Even if the number of activists proclaiming affinity with developments in Russia was 
initially small, the spectre of Bolshevism stalked the streets and political meetings and 
haunted the minds of the Majority SPD leadership and the old military elite in equal 
measure. Reports from the British Foreign Office detail another “foreign” determinant 
in 1918 / 19: the proximity of the wartime Allies limiting the revolution’s independent 
political development. These reports also indicate how the imperial military elite and the 
Majority SPD leadership were so obsessed with a perceived Bolshevik threat that officials 
in London often saw this — at least in part — as a weapon with which to force concessions 
over the food supply.33 
Subsequently, the spectre of Bolshevism took on physical substance, as the USPD’s left 
wing — including Richard Müller and many of other RSS — joined the now mass-based 
German Communist Party at the end of 1920 on the Comintern’s specifically Leninist 
terms. As one commentator has already pointed out, in his own writings Richard Müller 
30 Ibid., p. 223.
31 For another interesting overview of “inspiration by the Bolshevik example,” see Geoff Eley: 
Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850 – 2000, Oxford 2002, pp. 156 ff.
32 Peter Loesche: Der Bolschewismus im Urteil Der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 1903 – 1920, 
Berlin 1967, pp. 188 f. 
33 Francis L. Carsten: Britain and the Weimar Republic: The British Documents, London 1984, 
pp. 1 – 33.
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accept the need for the leading role of the revolutionary party.34 Although this qualifies 
Hoffrogge’s emphasis on continuity in Müller’s political thought, he represented an 
important component in the early KPD. This was a skilled workers’ form of radicalism 
which adopted a form of Leninist realpolitik and looked to winning majority support 
within the working class.35 As a “cautious and hesitant” trade unionist disposed towards 
painstaking organisational work, as Hoffrogge describes him, Richard Müller had long 
opposed “putschism” and purely party actions in favour of “united front” mobilisations 
within the existing trade unions.36 A resolute commitment to party work being rooted 
in the masses, as Hoffrogge shows, led to Müller being ousted from his leadership of 
the Communist Trade Union Centre — which coordinated trade-union policy — after 
the so-called “March Action” in 1921. Not only had this ill-fated uprising uprooted 
the KPD in its local strongholds, the factories and trade unions; crucially, ousting those 
criticising the Comintern’s excessive influence in 1921 / 22 highlighted the party’s early 
Bolshevisation. On this key theme in the historiography of the Communist Party — which 
recurs below — Hoffrogge reminds us that the party’s German roots were more diverse 
that the political traditions of “Luxemburgism”; Bolshevisation also sidelined trade-union 
officials with a political past in the pre-war labour movement. In the view of this reviewer 
at least, we should also note that the radicalism of Richard Müller and the Berlin RSS 
was one expression of regionally and locally based radicalisms in a mosaic of tendencies 
joining — and usually leaving — the early Communist Party.37 Interestingly, Müller took 
longer than most to leave the KPD. In new documentation found by the author in the 
Comintern Archive in Moscow — after the publication of the German version of this 
book — the author also details how Müller survived in the party until 1924, even playing 
a cameo role as an “ordinary soldier” in the events of 1923. It seems he was purged at 
this point, reminding us that the political development of the German communism and 
the party’s policies were as much to blame for damaging its roots among radical skilled 
workers organised in the trade unions as the structurally driven sociological division of 
the workers’ movement which is discussed below.
34 Ben Fowkes: Hoffrogge’s Richard Müller, unpublished paper delivered at a panel discussion 
marking the book’s publication, at Historical Materialism Conference in London, November 
2014. 
35 The seminal study of types of radicalism in the workers’ movement remains, Erhard Lucas: 
Zwei Formen von Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Frankfurt am Main 
1976.
36 Ralf Hoffrogge, Richard Müller, p. 235. 
37 For a much under cited pioneering study, see Gerhard P. Bassler: The Communist Movement 
in the German Revolution, 1918 – 1919: A Problem of Typology?, in: Central European 
History 6:3 (1973), pp. 233 – 277. 
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Against Stalin and Hitler
Marcel Bois’ study of the Left Opposition in the KPD also deals with “forgotten figures” 
in the history of German communism during the Weimar Republic. But this time what 
is on offer is a panorama of the diversity of groups and tendencies which, from the 
mid-1920s, to one extent or another opposed the policies pursued by Stalin in Soviet 
Russia. As the author points out, the fact that these communist groupings have all but 
vanished from our memory is all the more surprising as the Left constituted the dominant 
tendency in the membership.38 Unlike those activists who, like Richard Müller, promoted 
the “united front” policy, these activists held (ultra-) radical, uncompromising, sectarian 
and (in the early years of the Republic) putschist views, which led the party into the blind 
alley of social and political isolation.39 Yet there were domestic German reasons for this, as 
Marcel Bois notes: political polarisation during under the Weimar Republic was endemic, 
a product of war, revolution and recurrent crises. And this drove the radical Left’s belief 
that capitalism was not “the end of history.”40
What defined these groupings was their belief that Stalin had betrayed Lenin’s revolution 
and, during the second-half of the 1920s, they represented a “failed alternative” to the 
actual history of the KPD.41 One contribution made by this important study is adding 
to a surprisingly sparse literature, not least the history of significant internal-party groups 
such as the “Wedding Opposition.”42 When taken together with recent major biographies 
of Ruth Fischer and Werner Scholem, we now know much more about this dimension 
of the party’s history.43 In order to provide this, Marcel Bois’ research is a tour de force of 
38 Marcel Bois: Kommunisten gegen Hitler und Stalin: Die Linke Opposition der KPD in der 
Weimarer Republik, Berlin 2014, pp. 16 ff.
39 Ibid., p. 105.
40 Ibid., p. 526.
41 Ibid., pp. 16 – 17.
42 Otto Langels: Die Ultralinke Opposition der KPD in der Weimarer Republik: Zur Geschichte 
und Theorie der KPD-Opposition (Linke KPD), der Entschiedenen Linken, der Gruppe 
“Kommunistische Politik” und des Deutschen Industrie-Verbandes in den Jahren 1924 bis 1928, 
Frankfurt am Main 1984; Rüdiger Zimmermann: Der Leninbund: Linke Kommunisten in 
der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf 1978; Siegfried Bahne: Zwischen “Luxemburgismus” und 
“Stalinismus.” Die “ultralinke” Opposition in der KPD, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Geschichte 9 
(1961), pp. 359 – 381. For recent biographies of leading Left Communists, see Mario Kessler: 
Arthur Rosenberg: Ein Historiker im Zeitalter der Katastrophen (1889–1943), Cologne 2003; 
Mario Kessler: Ruth Fischer: Ein Leben mit und gegen Kommunisten (1895 – 1961), Cologne 
2013; Ralf Hoffrogge: Werner Scholem. 
43 For an ungenerous review of these three studies which also makes this point, see Wladislaw 
Hedeler: Neue Untersuchungen über Linke Kommunisten in der KPD, in: Jahrbuch für 
Historische Kommunismusforschung (2015), pp. 279 – 290.
125Recent Literature in Communist Studies
archival heavy lifting, spanning the party’s central records in Berlin and the groups’ own 
publications, police reports, regional, local and factory based archives, the Trotsky Papers 
in Harvard University as well as the Comintern’s Electronic Archive. 
Bois’ study begins by outlining the factional struggles in the Soviet leadership which 
intensified after Lenin’s death, and acted as the Left Opposition’s point of political 
orientation in what amounted to a parallel party history.44 When the former Left 
Opposition took the party leadership in 1924, they adopted the Comintern’s Bolshevisation 
campaign with élan. Although the chairman of the Comintern at this time was Zinoviev, 
Bolshevisation meant the creation of the “Stalinist” structures subsequently used to silence 
and, whenever required, “purge” internal party opposition. The Left leadership was later 
hung by its own petard. Yet subordination to Moscow was not what these younger, more 
independent and largely intellectual leaders had intended to do. Instead, their aim was 
to use these mechanisms to remake the party in their own, ultra-radical image. To these 
ends, the German Left declare that, “the party must be unified, its ideology unified, its 
structure unified,” and acted upon this by purging its factional opponents on the party’s 
“Right” as part of the Stalin-sanctioned campaign against “Trotskyism” as a “deviation from 
Leninism.”45 When the factional alignment in the Russian Communist Party changed, 
and the German Left ultimately refused to comply with the Comintern’s “moderation” of 
policy, the structures and party culture of “iron” hierarchical discipline were in place to 
oust them and install the new so-called “Comintern-loyal Left” under the radical former 
worker, Ernst Thälmann. Even Ruth Fischer, out of respect for “party discipline,” signed 
the Comintern’s “Open Letter,” which announced to an incredulous party membership 
that the leadership it had only just re-elected had been swept aside.46 
If taking power in 1924, in the immediate aftermath of the failed “German October” 
had united the Left, then the “Open Letter” blew it apart. Indeed Bois details the 
formation 15 groupings and tendencies which feuded with each other over largely 
ideological issues.47 Some were more prepared to distance themselves from Moscow that 
others. And the Comintern taught the new party leadership how to hammer on divisions 
between and within these groupings. Some prominent leaders, notably Karl Korsch and 
Werner Scholem, openly stated that “Stalinism” had led to a revival of capitalism; while 
the wider Left were rallied by slogans such as “Back to Lenin” and calls for a return to 
internal-party democracy which, they believed, could save the inheritance of October 
1917. 
44 Ibid., pp. 39 – 73.
45 Ibid., pp. 153 – 55.
46 Ibid., pp. 166 – 68.
47 An index of these groupings and tendencies is provided, see ibid., p. 611.
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Despite the fractures and cracks running through these groups, there were two 
significant attempts to reunify the German Left. The first of these was a campaign 
inside the KPD which collected the signatures of hundreds of party officials backing a 
“Declaration on the Russian Question” — or the “Letter of the 700” as it became known.48 
The campaign represented a rapprochement between the Left Opposition around 
Ruth Fischer and Hugo Urbahns and the Wedding Opposition — an under-researched 
nationwide umbrella grouping with strong support among local officials and activists — as 
well as a penumbra of others, notably Korsch’s “Intransigent Left.” With support for the 
“Letter” spanning members of the Central Committee (Hugo Urbahns) to party workers, 
the strength of opposition in the party was made clear. Its failure owed to developments 
in Moscow: the “capitulation” of Zinoviev, the erstwhile patron of the German Left, to 
Stalin in power struggle to succeed Lenin. Leon Trotsky, who did not capitulate to Stalin, 
also repudiated international factional alignments. Thus, abandoned by their allies in 
Moscow, the “Letter’s” ultimate impact on the KPD was to produce a mood in favour of 
“party unity” and an end to “factionalism”. 
The second attempt to unite the German Left against “Stalinism” was the formation of 
the Leninbund in early 1928, which followed the expulsion from the KPD of most of its 
leading figures.49 Initially, it looked like an umbrella organisation with potential. However, 
cracks soon appeared here too. There were disagreements about standing independent 
candidates in elections and, when the Comintern announced a renewed ‘ultra-left’ policy, 
Ruth Fischer and Arkadi Maslow (unsuccessfully) applied to be re-admittance to the KPD. 
Only Hugo Urbahns stood firm in the Leninbund. The local group in Suhl, which had 
been the group’s stronghold, defected to the SPD en masse. A further grouping around 
Anton Grylewicz became the centre of gravity for German supporters of Trotsky. 
A following chapter is devoted to how these groups, influenced by Trotsky’s theory of 
fascism, abandoned their earlier sectarianism and took seriously the very real threat posed 
by the rise of National Socialism after 1930. While the KPD held to the Comintern’s 
theory of “social fascism,” which justified treating Social Democracy as the “main enemy,” 
these Trotskyist grouping initiated local “united front” mobilisations, for example in 
Bruchsal and Oranienburg.50 
Marcel Bois then compliments these political and organisational insights by detailing 
the sociology of the Left Opposition and what its members did, including a form 
of “revolutionary parliamentarism” in the Reichstag and a more practice approach to 
municipal government.51 Most significantly, prosopographical insights — derived from 
a database containing some 1,260 biographies — are used to change our understanding 
48 Ibid., pp. 212 – 27, 527.
49 Ibid., pp. 253ff, 527 f.
50 Ibid, pp. 18, 21 – 22, 24, 36, 529 – 31.
51 Ibid, pp. 36, 525 – 26.
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of who these activists were. Previously, we thought that they comprised intellectuals, the 
unemployed and those new to the labour movement. Instead, we discover that the social 
profile of Left Communism was little different from the wider party: two-thirds of them 
were workers; over 50 per cent had been in the Communist Party from 1919 / 20; most 
were under 40 years of age; and very few women were involved. And, although there 
was a degree of nationwide support, their strongholds were in Berlin, the Ruhr and Pfalz. 
The book’s conceptual framework — and leitmotiv — is an extensive, empirically-
informed engagement with Hermann Weber’s “Stalinisation thesis,” according to which 
the KPD jettisoned its revolutionary ambitions in Germany and implemented Moscow’s 
policy directives, which in the first instance served the regime’s non-revolutionary foreign 
policy.52 For these reasons, Marcel Bois’ stresses the indispensability of Weber’s political 
and organisational approach precisely because the documentary basis leaves no doubt 
that the plans to eliminate the anti-Stalinist opposition in Germany were hatched 
by the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, passed on to the Comintern and 
implemented in Germany by Stalin’s placemen, most prominently Ernst Thälmann.53 As 
we will see below, the same development occurred in the American Communist Party. Yet, 
as Marcel Bois concedes, the Left had built Stalin’s scaffold from which they were swung; 
and these grouping would have purged the party of its remaining “moderates” — such as 
Ernst Meyer and Clara Zetkin — who supported the “united front” tactic and working 
within the wider labour movement. Their leadership might even have isolated the party 
before the Comintern’s “left turn” in 1928.54 
To achieve all of this, a lengthy study was required: the book pushes 600 pages. But 
the space is used well in order to provide an extensive contextualisation of the origins 
and development of the German Left. Discussions of “alternatives” to Stalin have been 
prominent in the literature over the past half century and Bois’ focus is on Trotsky as the 
heir to Leninism “betrayed”; others looked to Bukharin.55 But what was it an alternative to 
in second half of the 1920? My own earlier research called Ruth Fischer’s “Bolshevisation” 
campaign “Stalinisation with a different name.”56 And what would the alternative have 
been at the end of the 1920s? After all, the Comintern’s “new line” was a return to the 
52 For an English translation of Hermann Weber’s “Stalinisation thesis”, see Hermann 
Weber: The Stalinization of the KPD: Old and New Views, in: Norman LaPorte / Kevin 
Morgan / Matthew Worley (eds.): Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern: Perspectives on 
Stalinization, 1917 – 53, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 22 – 44. For Marcel Bois discussion of these 
issues, see Marcel Bois, Kommunisten, pp. 28 – 33.
53 Marcel Bois, Kommunisten, pp. 34, 528.
54 Ibid., p. 529 f.
55 Perhaps the most notable of these studies is, Stephen Cohen: Bukharin and the Bolshevik 
Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888 – 1938, Oxford 1980.
56 Norman LaPorte: The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924 – 1933: Factionalism, 
Fratricide and Political Failure, Oxford 2003, pp. 79 – 131.
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Left’s “old line”. The answer, as suggested previously by Uta Stolle, is that it would have 
been a German vanguard party which did not dance to Moscow tune and did respond 
to developments in Germany.57 Their point of reference was Lenin’s October 1917 and 
global revolution, not Stalin’s “socialism in one country.” The German Left may have been 
a failed alternative, but those principled individual who risked their lives — not least in 
genuine antifascist ventures after Hitler came to power — should not be forgotten.
Deutschland, Russland, Komintern — 
Interpreting the “Archival Revolution” 
The documentary collection Deutschland, Russland, Komintern, is the culmination of 
an important collaboration between leading German and Russian historians: Hermann 
Weber, Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Jakov Drabkin and Aleksandr Galkin. The publication also 
benefited from the adept assistance of Gleb J. Albert, a member of the new generation 
of communism experts with polyglot as well as historical skills, who aided the process 
of editing the material for publication.58 All three volumes are freely available on the 
internet, offering easy-to-access for researchers.59 The main theme running throughout 
the documents is the modes of action allowing the Russian Politburo to set Comintern 
policy, and how this impacted on the KPD and on German-Soviet foreign relations. In 
addition, the editors have written scene-setting introductory chapters.
While the publication of these documents constitute a vast contribution to 
communist studies alone, the editors’ foreword notes that interpretation — based on 
the type of academic freedom absent under Stalinism — always remains the heart and 
soul of the historian’s task. So how have these documents — and the wider “archival 
revolution” — reshaped our understanding of the relationship between the KPD and 
Moscow? One observation from reading these documents is to note just how accurate 
Hermann Weber’s pioneering early research was. Long before the Soviet Union collapsed 
and the archive doors were opened, Weber’s work relied upon what were essentially stray 
documents in West German archives, a vast number of interviews with former leading 
German Communists and opens sources, such as official communist publications and 
57 Uta Stolle: Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb, Cologne 1980, pp. 268 ff.
58 See, for example, Gleb J. Albert: “Esteemed Comintern!”: The Communist International 
and World-Revolutionary Charisma in Early Soviet Society, in: Twentieth Century 
Communism 8:1 (2015), pp. 10 – 39. 
59 See http://degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/212875 (accessed on 1 July 2016).
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those of dissident communist groups. Nevertheless, as his introductory essay in this 
volume details, the archival revolution has modified his “Stalinisation thesis” to account 
for a very early process of Bolshevisation which, in turn, flowed into Stalinisation.60 
In summary, Hermann Weber uses the new documentation to show that, as the Soviet 
regime began to consolidate its hold on power in the course of 1920, the Comintern 
was able to play the dominant role in relations with the KPD. An example of this is 
how, at the beginning of 1921, Radek, Bukharin and the Comintern’s emissaries in 
Germany — notably Guralski and Bela Kun — overthrew the KPD leadership around Paul 
Levi for questioning Moscow’s authority. Then, together with the so-called “pro-Soviet 
left” group around Heinrich Brandler, they drove a policy of forcing a German uprising 
in support of the Soviet state which had been shaken by the Kronstadt rising.61 As clear 
evidence of these objectives, Hermann Weber cites a letter from Kun to Lenin in May 
1921.62 This was a turning point in the KPD’s history, a development which was also 
impressively detailed in Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten’s classic study, which was published when 
the archives remained closed.63 From now on, the Comintern could intervene — whatever 
the impact on the German communist movement — to appoint and remove party leaders, 
as suited Moscow’s needs.
The early intersection of reasons of state, foreign policy and the pursuit of the German 
revolution are, as Hermann Weber’s essay elucidates, personified by Karl Radek, the 
Comintern’s “Germany expert.” A year after pushing for revolution, he played a key role in 
the diplomacy preceding the Rapallo Treaty (1922). Indeed, Radek was received by no one 
less than German Chancellor.64 Before these new insights from the Soviet archives, Weber 
had emphasised that the key changes in the relationship between the KPD and Moscow 
took shape after Lenin’s death in January 1924, which was compounded by the party’s 
60 In this regard, Hermann Weber credits the work of Wladislaw Hedeler / Alexander Vatlin (eds.): 
Die Weltpartei aus Moskau: Der Gründungskongress der Kommunistischen Internationale 
1919: Protokoll und neue Dokumente, Berlin 2008.
61 See, for example, Jean-Francois Fayet: Karl Radek (1885 – 1939): Biographie Politique, Bern 
2004; Wolf-Dietrich Gutjahr: “Revolution muss sein:” Karl Radek – Die Biographie, Cologne 
2012.
62 Hermann Weber: Zum Verhältnis von Komintern, Sowjetstaat und KPD, in: Hermann 
Weber / Jakov Drabkin / Bernhard Bayerlein (eds.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern, vol. 1, 
Berlin 2014, esp. pp. 40 – 44; Hermann Weber / Jakov Drabkin / Bernhard Bayerlein (eds.): 
Deutschland, Russland, Komintern, vol. 2, Document 43.
63 Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten: Aufstand der Avantgarde: Die Marzaktion der KPD 1921, 
Frankfurt / New York 1986. 
64 Hermann Weber: Zum Verhältnis von Komintern, Sowjetstaat und KPD, pp. 4, 68 and 
documents 58 and 117. 
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“failed October” in 1923.65 Yet, as Bernhard H. Bayerlein reminds us in his introductory 
essay, Stalin and Stalinism were a ‘retreat from the original Bolshevik project’ of world 
revolution and, as such, 1924 remains a crucial turning point.66 
Bayerlein and Weber’s long-standing collaboration in order to bring the documentation 
to a wider readership, notably in the ‘Archive des Kommunismus’ series, offers ex-
tensive additional coverage of some the developments touched on here. For example, 
documentation underscoring the determining influence of the Soviet Politburo in the 
so-called “German October” (1923) and the ‘Thälmann-Skandal’ in which Stalin and 
Molotov intervened personally to reinstate Stalin loyalist and party chairman, Ernst 
Thälmann in 1928.67 In all of these developments, Hermann Weber’s early research 
had been able to illuminate even the shadowy corners of the informal, conspiratorial 
networks used by the Russian Communist Party leadership and Comintern to Stalinise 
the Communist Party.68 What has changed in this respect is the quality of the primary 
sources as a foundation for much greater precision in the reconstruction and analysis of 
events.
This, of course, is crucial to the historical study of German communism. To take 
one important example, the new documentation — as Weber and Bayerlein detail — now 
leaves no doubt about the decisive role of Moscow in forcing the KPD’s participation in 
a referendum to dissolve the SPD-led Prussia Landtag, even although this meant standing 
on the same side as the Stahlhelm and Nazi Party.69 These events were already outlined by 
Weber in his major study of the KPD’s fateful role in the politics of the early 1930s.70 We 
knew, for example, about the last minute decision at the end of July 1931 to risk adopting 
this policy; and we could be almost certain that the decision was taken in Moscow and 
probably grew out of a power struggle in the party leadership over how best to implement 
the Comintern’s “general line.” But key details remained a matter of conjecture. We now 
know that almost the entire KPD leadership — spanning the Sekretariat, Politburo and 
Central Committee — opposed participating in there referendum campaign scheduled for 
early August. However, Heinz Neumann wrote to Wilhelm Pieck, the party’s representative 
65 See also, Hermann Weber: The Stalinization of the KPD: Old and New Views.
66 Bernhard Bayerlein: Deutscher Kommunismus und globaler Stalinismus – Komintern, KPD 
und die Sowjetunion (1929 – 1943), in: Hermann Weber / Jakov Drabkin / Bernhard Bayerlein 
(eds.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern, p. 235.
67 Hermann Weber / Bernhard Bayerlein (eds.): Deutscher Oktober 1923: Ein Revolutionsplan 
und sein Scheitern, Berlin 2003; Hermann Weber / Bernhard Bayerlein (eds.): Der Thälmann-
Skandal: Geheime Korrespondenz mit Stalin, Berlin 2003.
68 Herman Weber: Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der 
Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt am Main 1969, pp. 120 ff.
69 Hermann Weber: Verhältnis Komintern, Sowjetstaat und KPD, pp. 86f; Bernhard Bayerlein: 
Deutscher Kommunismus, pp. 252 f. 
70 Hermann Weber: Hauptfeind Sozialdemokratie: Strategie und Taktik der KPD 1929 – 1933, 
Dusseldorf 1982. 
131Recent Literature in Communist Studies
with the ECCI in Moscow, pointing out that participation could be “expedient” on the 
basis that, to succeed, the referendum needed greater numbers than the Stahlhelm and 
Nazis could mobilise. Fresh elections, according to Neumann, were likely to produce a 
communist electoral victory in the SPD’s last bastion. After sounding out members of 
the Comintern and Russian Politburo, Pieck replied on 20 July, stating that: “among 
leading comrades, not only of the Comintern but also of the [Bolshevik] party, there is the 
unanimous view that the party [KPD] should participate in the referendum at all costs.”71 
The entire KPD leadership then conducted a u-turn, following Moscow’s — ultimately 
Stalin’s — directive. Ernst Thälmann and Joseph Winternitz, the head of the Agitprop 
Division, were the only two leaders who refused to participate because of the likely impact 
this would have on attempts to win over Social Democratic workers in the so-called 
“united front from below.”72 There is, however, something missing: a direct reference to 
Stalin let alone his signature. Here we are still left to guess what was inside Stalin’s mind; 
and the insights of Thomas Weingartner in 1970, as Bayerlein flags up, remains our best 
guide. According to Weingartner’s close reading of the Soviet press, Stalin wanted to 
prevent Germany’s “western orientation” — as championed by the SPD — which at this 
point involved a feared rapprochement with France.73  
Pointing to the wider collection of archival materials published in this volume, as well 
as the deposits in Moscow that he has been a prime mover in unearthing, Bayerlein stresses 
that Moscow consistently underestimated the existential danger posed by a Nazi “seizure 
of power” and the cataclysm this would provoke in the global system. Indeed, reading 
between the lines, he states that Stalin would have prefer to work with the Nazis than a 
Social Democratic government, even if he assured Ernst Thälmann in November 1932 
that any prospect of Hitler taking power was “unthinkable.”74
71 Hermann Weber / Jakov Drabkin / Bernhard Bayerlein (eds.): Deutschland, Russland, 
Komintern, vol. 2, Document 266.
72 For relations between the Russian Communist Party Politburo, the Comintern and the KPD, 
see also Bert Hoppe: In Stalins Gefolgschaft. Moskau und die KPD 1928 – 1933, Munich 
2007; for a summary of his work in English, see: Bert Hoppe: Iron Revolutionaries and salon 
Socialists: Bolsheviks and German Communists in the 1920s and 1930s, in: Kritika 10 (2009), 
pp. 499 – 526.
73 Thomas Weingartner: Stalin und der Aufsteig Hitlers: Die Deutschlandpolitik der Sowjetunion 
und der Kommunistischen Internationale, Berlin 1970.
74 Bernhard Bayerlein: Deutscher Kommunismus, p. 256; a number of studies believed that 
Stalin anticipated a military dictatorship, see, for example, Heinrich August Winkler: Der Weg 
in die Katastrophe: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 1930 – 1933, 
Berlin / Bonn 1987, pp. 734ff; Horst Duehnke: Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945, Cologne 1972, 
pp. 60 – 61.
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Even when Hitler did take power — provoking astonishment in Moscow — the 
leadership of the Russian Communist Party, as Bayerlein details, completely failed to 
appreciate that this marked a “historic watershed.”75 The Comintern and leading German 
Communists, notably Fritz Heckert, insisted that the “Hitler-regime” could not last and 
the use of violence against Nazism’s political enemies would finally dispel any “democratic 
illusions” among the “working people.” As these events unfolded in Germany, the KPD 
lost all contact with the Comintern leadership. The ECCI’s first pronouncement did not 
come until early April. 
The documents are also used to debunk a cornerstone in the German Democratic 
Republic’s claim to continuity in “antifascism.” The protocol of Ernst Thälmann’s last speech 
to the party leadership, held in secret on the fringes of Berlin, was certainly embellished 
by the regime’s leadership, if not actually falsified. In this regard, the international role 
of “antifascist campaigns” — led by propaganda Meister, Willi Münzenberg — were, from 
the Soviet Politburo’s perspective at least, no more that exercises in “soft power” without 
real political commitment. While account is given to the “contradictory” nature of the 
statements issued by Moscow, Bayerlein draws on the documentation to stress it is at least 
probable that, from 1933, Stalin’s actual aim was a pact with Hitler, as achieved in 1939.76 
This area of interpretation is the only aspect of an otherwise compelling documentary-
based analysis that seems questionable. After all, the Western “democracies” as well as 
the Third Reich saw “Popular Front” governments come to power in France and Spain, 
influencing their policies and the international balance of power, not least in the Spanish 
civil war.77 
A Transnational Methodology — 
from Germany to the USA
Bayerlein’s chapter is also a call for a transnational approach to Stalinism by deploying 
Hermann Weber’s Stalinisation model as a conceptual framework for the comparative 
study of global communism.78 According to this framework, the organisations projecting 
Soviet power are the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party, the Comintern and 
its “national sections”; and the agents of Stalinist bureaucratisation in this transnational 
75 Bernhard Bayerlein: Deutscher Kommunismus, pp. 262 ff.
76 Bernhard Bayerlein: Deutscher Kommunismus, pp. 270, 244 ff.
77 For a useful summary of these issues of international relations form the Soviet perspective, see 
Chris Ward: Stalin’s Russia, London 1992, pp. 176, 177 – 180.
78 The Stalinisation model was adopted as the methodology informing the contributions 
to, Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley’s Bolshevism, Stalinism and the 
Comintern: Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917 – 53, which covers Europe and North America. 
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process operated through both formal and informal networks with a worldwide reach. 
As examples, Bayerlein points to the transnational nature of the “Great Terror”, which 
was pumped through — and decimated — the Comintern and its “national sections”, and 
the use of “socialism in one country” as a model to be exported to the developing world 
in order to create a Soviet presence here too. In this way, Stalinism — ultimately Stalin’s 
“personal dictatorship” — is viewed as a transnational phenomenon, which — unlike 
“totalitarian theory” — accounts for social interaction and change over time as well as 
top-down political domination. 
Although there are few directly comparative approaches offering a global 
transnational approach to Stalinism and Stalinisation as proposed by Bayerlein, there are 
studies — including those based on archival research using the Comintern’s files — which 
allow historians to make indirect comparisons.79 One such study is Jacob Zumoff’s The 
Communist International and US Communism, 1919 – 1929 which, when addressing the 
processes of “Stalinisation”, has striking parallels with the KPD. Indeed, Jacob Zumoff 
explicitly engages with Hermann Weber’s model when defining the Stalinisation of the 
American Communist Party (CPUSA).80 The historiography which Jacob Zumoff’s study 
is situated within also reflect the same debates that run through the study of the KPD, 
turning on the balance between exogenous (Moscow) and endogenous (German /America) 
factors. And these debates also follow the same generational changes, from the writing of 
former Communists with insider knowledge (Hermann Weber and Theodor Draper) to 
the rise of social history from the 1960s; and from the rise of “neo-orthodox” studies after 
the “archival revolution” of the 1990s to the influence of the “cultural turn” in the twenty-
first century.81 In these issues of methodology, Jacob Zumoff positions himself firmly in 
the political-history camp, rejecting those who try to write communist history as the 
party’s absorption in a wider social and cultural milieu. Unlike in Germany, communism 
was a fringe phenomenon. In capitalism’s largest and most important country there were 
only some 12 – 14,000 members in the mid-1920s, which placed it on the periphery of 
both domestic politics and the Comintern’s political planning. 
Despite the one-size-fits-all approach to policy adopted by the ECCI, there were, 
of course, local and national peculiarities which meant that the implementation the 
Comintern’s “lines” had different impacts in different locations. Most significantly, there 
was the crucial issue of racial oppression in the USA, which was acute and immediate 
there — if not absent in the western European empires. In this respect, and in the party’s 
79 For a discussion of the problems of indirect comparisons using the example of the German 
“Sonderweg”, see Jürgen Kocka: Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German 
“Sonderweg”, in: History and Theory 38:1 (1999), pp. 40 – 50. 
80 Jacob A. Zumoff: The Communist International and US Communism: 1919 – 1929, 
Leiden / Boston 2014, pp. 12 ff.
81 For a discussion of the historiography of the American Communist Party, see ibid., pp. 3 – 7.
134 Norman LaPorte
early work within the American labour movement, the author emphases the Comintern’s 
overwhelmingly “positive” role in “Americanising” the party as part of a “good Lenin, bad 
Stalin” narrative.
However, the affinities with the experience of the KPD and its relationship with 
the Comintern and Russian Communist Party are almost a carbon copy. The Workers 
(Communist) Party — it only took the name Communist Party of the USA in 1929 — was 
founded in 1919 / 20 out of a split in the Socialist Party. The party’s policy is then driven 
by a Comintern emissary, Joseph Pogany, who implemented the ill-fated overtures towards 
the American Farm-Labour Party. After the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (1924), the 
party implemented Zinoviev’s “Bolshevisation” campaign and, from the mid-1920s there 
was intense, inward-looking factionalism in which alliances were made with Bolshevik 
patrons. After Ruthenberg died (1927), he is replaced by Jay Lovestone, a Bukharin 
supporter, who in turn is ousted in favour of the Stalin loyalist, Earl Browder. During 
this period — as detailed by Marcel Bois for the KPD — a Trotskyist “Left Opposition” 
formed under James P Cannon, who was purged in 1928; this grouping — like the 
Leninbund — lost support during the Comintern’s so-called “Third Period” because of 
the attraction of Moscow’s revolutionary rhetoric, if not action.
While many authors who have made a significant contribution to communist studies 
hold (one of a variety of ) Marxist profiles, or have had in the past, there is one crucial area 
in which Zumoff’s work falls short of historical distance.82 The author presents the policies 
of the Comintern’s so-called “Third Period” as a time when American “Communists 
were at their most heroic,” forming independent trade unions, fighting “Jim Crow” 
(that is racism) and organising the unemployed. Zumoff then asserts that the “social 
democratic aspects of Stalinism became clear in the popular-front period of the 1930s.”83 
What is meant here is ending the fight against “social democracy” in cross-class alliances 
represented a break with the Leninist struggle against “reformism” and the “bourgeois.” 
But surely, as the author also alludes to, this a policy imposed by Moscow — just like the 
“Third Period.” This, and other uncritical usages of Leninist concepts and language, will 
jar with many readers. 
82 Jacob Zumoff makes clear his sympathies for and commitment to Leninism, see especially 
pp. 20 f.
83 Ibid., pp. 365 – 66.
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Communists Against the Bourgeois State 
The histories of the German and American Communist Party discussed above are 
primarily party histories, which address the nature of the dynamics between Berlin and 
Moscow and how this impacted on German — and American — communism. They do 
not omit the wider domestic context in which German communism functioned, such as 
the early mass movement in the case of Ralf Hoffrogge’s study or the party’s sociology and 
everyday political activities as detailed by Marcel Bois; but it is covered as background, 
increasingly subordinate to the causal relationship with the Russian Communist Party 
and the Comintern. There are, however, influential social histories which set out to 
explain why Communists could internalise the ultra-leftism of the Comintern’s “Third 
Period.” The first of these was the view that industrial “rationalisation” — or modernising 
the economy to increase productivity — which was endorsed by the SPD — gave a 
sociological basis to the political split in the workers’ movement. The SPD represented 
relatively affluent and skilled workers, who were disposed to the long-term political 
orientation of “reformism;” the Communist Party, by contrast, represented the unskilled, 
unemployed and under-employed workers who tended to favour spontaneous actions in 
their immediate material interest or were pushed from the factories onto the streets.84 To 
use Klaus-Michael Mallmann’s conceptualisation, by around 1930 the KPD had been 
uprooted from the milieu that had spanned the parties in the trade unions, sporting and 
leisure organisations until the end of the 1920s.85 As the Great Depression hit Germany 
at the end of the 1920s, Eve Rosenhaft’s pioneering social-history approach concluded 
that, to the KPD’s rank-and-file membership, there appeared to be a war on two fronts, 
as the Comintern asserted. On the one hand, the party fought the Nazis on the streets; 
while, on the other hand, they were subjected to SPD administrations which — above 
all in Prussia — pursued policies of severe austerity and heavy-handed, anti-Communist 
84 For a discussion of this strand in the historiography in English, see Norman LaPorte: Local 
Communisms. 
85 Klaus-Michael Mallmann sets out his views in summary in: Klaus Michael Mallmann: 
Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Kommunismus in 
der Weimarer Republik, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21:1 (1995), pp. 5 – 31.
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policing.86 For these reasons, the SPD’s Minister of the Interior in Prussia, Carl Severing, 
and the head of the Berlin police force, Albert Grzesinski, became hate figures among 
Communists.87
Even if we see this as a “secondary” factor, giving the “Third Period” in Germany 
more meaning that in, for example, Britain or the United States, the size of German mass 
movement ensured that this had a significant impact on an already polarised political 
culture. The corrosive effect of the Stalinised Communist Party — and the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party — on political culture during the Weimar Republic is 
one of the main contributions made by Hennig Grunwald’s Courtroom to Revolutionary 
Stage. While this study contributes to our wider understanding of communism during the 
Weimar Republic, it is primarily located in the historiography of the legal system, rather 
than communist studies per se. In this respect, the author widens the traditional focus 
on judges to the rise of party lawyers and barristers who fronted the Communists’ and 
Nazis’ fight against the “Weimar system” in the courtroom, which was communicated 
to the public via the media in a manner poisoning the body politic. Grunwald does not 
contradict the “orthodox view” that the Republic’s judges were hardly impartial; they were, 
he concedes, drawn from the Wilhelmine social elite and remained more loyal to the old 
order that the new.88 But they alone, he argues, could not have had such a terminally 
destructive impact on Weimar’s political culture; this required the rise of the party political 
layers of the political extremes.89 
Reviewers more familiar with the history of Nazis than I am have stressed the 
originality and significance of Grunwald’s treatment of the rise of the National Socialist 
Legal Organisation, which was strongly influenced by the Communists’ courtroom 
performance.90 His treatment of the KPD’s legal organisation, “Red Aid” (Rote Hilfe) 
is also an original and helpful contribution to our understanding of the wider role of 
German communism.91 
86 Eve Rosenhaft: Beating the Fascists?: The German Communists and Political Violence, 
1929 – 1933, Cambridge 1983, esp. p. 211; Eric Weitz paid generous tribute to Rosenhaft’s 
pioneering approach, see Eve Rosenhaft: Beating the Fascists: An Appreciation, in: Twentieth 
Century Communism 2 (2010), pp. 169 – 179.
87 The most influential study of the Berlin police and its anti-communism is, Laing Hsi-huey: 
Die Berliner Polizei in der Weimarer Republik, Berlin 1977. 
88 Henning Grunwald: Courtroom, pp. 12f, 214, 216.
89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 See Benjamin Hett’s review in: English Historical Review 538 (2014), p. 230.
91 Other studies have overlooked the courtroom dimension of the “Red Aids” role in Germany, 
which also covered, for example, “humanitarian” relief work. Indeed, the umbrella organisation 
was founded by Willi Münzenberg at Lenin’s suggestion to promote famine relief for Soviet 
Russia in 1921. Among the most prominent German supporters of Rote Hilfe was Albert 
Einstein, see Henning Grunwald: Courtroom, pp. 132, 216; Heinrich August Winkler: 
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As a peg on which to hang his main argument, the book opens with an anecdote. In 
July 1925, Joseph Gärtner, a provincial party official and playwright, stood before the 
State Court for Protection of the Republic in Leipzig. The charge was “high treason” and 
the crime was the artistic direction of a celebration marking the anniversary of the October 
Revolution in a Stuttgart beer cellar; the sentence was 15 month imprisonments. Yet this 
outcome was celebrated, not lamented by the KPD. Gärtner’s party lawyer, Ferdinand 
Timpe, wrote to the leading communist Wilhelm Pieck, who also headed “Red Aid”, 
stating that: “The press box was packed, just like the courtroom itself, thanks to advanced 
reporting in the papers [...] The Staatsgerichthof swallowed our bait hook, line and sinker.”92 
The role of the lawyer, Henning Grunwald observes, had changed from the advocate of 
the defendant’s interests to those of the party; the defendant’s role was as willing martyr 
in an intransigent, uncompromising struggle against the Republic. The courtroom had 
become a revolutionary stage from which to project this ideological message. 
These developments are located in shifts within German legal culture which were 
already taking place from the later Wilhelmine period. The “military trial” in 1914 of 
Rosa Luxemburg and her lawyer (and lover), Paul Levi, serves as an apt illustration. We 
are then taken through a number of prominent trails of Communist during the 1920s and 
the role of the KPD’s growing staff of lawyers employed through the aegis of the party’s 
“Central Legal Offices.” The examples used cover, for example, Max Hölz in 1921 for his 
involvement in the so-called “March Action” and subsequent campaigns for his release, as 
well and the trials of party leaders, Arkadi Maslow and Hugo Urbahns in the mid 1920s. 
At times the details of individual Communists and communist history were inaccurate. 
For example, Maslow was not the leader of the Hamburg Communists in 1923; and 
the statements subsequently made against him by Ruth Fischer need to be qualified 
by the fact that she was his life-long partner. Similarly, the KPD leadership’s attack 
on Maslow and Hugo Urbahns — who did head the Communist Party in the district 
of Wasserkante — related to the factional struggle in the party and, in Hugo Urbahns 
case, a reluctance to become a martyr.93 Had the author read, for example, Hermann 
Weber’s encyclopaedic Wandlung der deutschen Kommunismus this party-political context 
would have been clear, as would Max Hölz’s membership of the split-off Communist 
Workers’ Party of Germany — even if the trial was instrumentalised by the KPD for its 
own purposes. 
These small gripes aside, Grunwald’s contribution to an under-researched aspect of 
the history of the KPD is as important as it is interesting. We can now add courtroom 
militancy to the movement’s ideologically-motivated violence on the streets and the 
Der Schein der Normalität: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 
1924 – 1930, Berlin / Bonn 1987, pp. 275 – 76.
92 Henning Grunwald: Courtroom, pp. 1 – 3. 
93 Ibid., pp. 119, 128.
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role its paramilitary organisation, the League of Red Front-Fighters; parliament, where 
performance and disruption were also deployed, as Marcel Bois’ study details; in election 
campaigns and other mobilisations, such as the referendum in Prussia in 1931; as well as 
in the factories. Especially during the so-called period of “relative stabilisation,” Grunwald 
notes that these trials helped maintain a sense of revolutionary purpose.94 Drawing on 
earlier comparative research into the political extremes by Andreas Wirsching and the 
revival of variants of “totalitarian theory” and “political religion,” the author has also made 
a cultural history contribution to how the KPD forged an emotionally underpinned a 
sense of community and political mission among its members.95
“Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed 
and Something Blue”: Concluding Comments
For students studying communism today, the topic has become history proper. The 
“alternative” to global capitalism has vanished, leaving only the China in its stead, 
which few if any would recognise as carrying the communist gene. Yet there is still a 
“spectre of communism” from the October Revolution of 1917, at least on the pages of 
specialist literature — the writings of Leon Trotsky’s. As Stephen Kotkin has pointed out, 
Trotsky’s ideas, if not his politics, have influenced seminal “revisionist” studies — notably 
those by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Moshe Lewin.96 Trotsky’s conceptualisation of Stalinist 
“degeneration” and account of how the bureaucracy was used as a political power base in 
order to end the Bolsheviks’ early revolutionary ambitions is also peppered throughout 
many of the studies reviewed here — most explicitly in Marcel Bois’ detailed appraisal of 
the KPD’s Left Opposition. 
This is something “old” in communist studies. Something “borrowed” is taken from 
Hermann Weber’s compelling “Stalinisation model” which continues to engage a new 
generation of researchers, in Germany and beyond. Much of the “new” is an empirical 
engagement with Weber’s thesis, which has been refined by Ralf Hoffrogge and Marcel 
Bois and further developed by Bernhard Bayerlein in his appeal for a transnational, 
comparative methodology. Ralf Hoffrogge’s biography of Richard Müller illustrates 
how the KPD’s inheritance was much wider that “Luxemburgism”. He shows how the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards were early champions of winning over a majority of the 
working class for “revolution from below,” as well as being advocates of internal-party 
democracy. Yet, as Marcel Bois’ study of the Left Opposition makes clear, there was a strong 
94 Ibid., p. 216.
95 Ibid., pp. 171ff, 216.
96 Stephen Kotkin: Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilisation, Berkley 1995, pp. 14 f.
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dynamic from within the revolutionary left in Germany which, in the absence of a mass 
movement by the early 1920, became attracted to the Bolshevik model of the disciplined, 
ultra-centralised vanguard party and revolution from above. The periodisation of when 
the Comintern’s “national parties” were Stalinised, and the related issue of continuity with 
Leninism, many be debated; but nobody questions Stalinism as the defining ideology 
and practice of communism from the later 1920s onwards. If researchers adopt Bernhard 
Bayerlein’s call for a transnational approach to communist studies with the Stalinisation 
model as a comparative conceptual framework, we could even see an increase in scholarly 
interest in this way of exploring communist history. 
The “new” has grown out of the “old” in a fruitful dialectic, to borrow from Marx. 
Beyond this, however, there is another “new:” the importance of culturalist approaches, 
as provided here by Hennig Grunwald. This type of study aids our understanding of what 
it meant to be a Communist as well as how communism challenged the societies it grew 
out of, whether this was Tsarist Russia, Weimar Germany or pre-revolutionary China. At 
least in the study of the KPD, the field still awaits a historian to synthesise what we now 
know from publications prioritising political and organisation approaches with insights 
drawn from culturalist methodologies. 
This leaves us with “something blue.” To use the colours associated with the United 
Kingdom’s political spectrum, “blue” represents the right. If Bernhard Bayerlein is correct 
that Stalin favoured an anti-Western alliance with the Nazi Party and assorted ultra-
nationalist, then the colours of Stalinism include “blue” too. But his, in my view at least, 
needs further research in the vast archival legacy historians have been presented with since 
1990. The revolution is dead; long live the (archival) revolution.97
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